This paper aims to contribute to the ESM's capacity to monitor sovereign vulnerabilities in the EFSF/ESM programme countries. The purpose is to early identify a build-up of sovereign vulnerabilities, which may threaten countries' repayment capacity. The assessment is based on a wide set of indicators comprising (i) government borrowing needs, conditions and debt structure, (ii) economic strength, (iii) fiscal position, (iv) financial sector and other contingent liabilities, (v) institutional parameters, and (vi) private sector leverage, credit flows and real estate developments. We apply a scoring system based on thresholds from the literature, where available, or derived from the historical distribution of a pool of OECD and EU countries. The aggregation scheme for an overall vulnerability score is informed by the available literature, correlation and principal component analyses, as well as expert judgement. The results of the framework as such are, however, free of judgement. We complement the numerical results with a system of traffic lights that allows assigning individual countries one of four broad categories reflecting degrees of their vulnerabilities. The framework can be used for a real-time vulnerability assessment, for an analysis of the evolution over time, as well as for an identification of areas where policy action may be needed. Back-tests for the countries that eventually requested EFSF/ESM financial assistance show that, with the benefit of hindsight, the tool would have identified the build-up of vulnerabilities well ahead of the onset of the crisis. The assessment, summarised in the form of a heat map and a scorecard, can be regularly updated.
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Introduction
The economic and sovereign debt crisis provided many lessons for economic policies in the euro area and elsewhere. One of the most important lessons is the need to early identify and address the build-up of macroeconomic imbalances and to maintain sound economic positions that provide sufficient buffers against adverse economic shocks. At the same time, vulnerabilities may arise from a broad spectrum of areas. Recent experience shows that not only fiscal imbalances, but also financial sector vulnerabilities, loss of competitiveness or external imbalances may lie at the heart of countries' problems. Finally, in the context of a monetary union, deep financial and economic linkages bring a strong risk of contagion. In this situation, even seemingly peripheral problems may spill over to the whole currency block.
Taking these lessons into account in the euro area context, it appears essential to closely monitor vulnerabilities across a broad range of economic and financial areas, including institutional considerations, and in a systematic manner across countries. The aim of this paper is to build a comprehensive, yet easy to use, scorecard for assessing vulnerabilities of the EFSF/ESM programme countries. It should allow to early identify a build-up of vulnerabilities, which may endanger their repayment capacity.
The design of the scorecard is informed by previous literature, our own quantitative analysis and expert judgement. Beyond the setup of this cross-country and cross-time homogenous framework, the results are, however, free of any judgement.
The results indicate a more pronounced increase in vulnerabilities prior to the economic crisis in countries that subsequently experienced financing pressures or lost market access, compared to the control group of EU and OECD countries. While predicting financing distress and economic crises is always difficult, back-testing of the scorecard indicates that, with benefit of hindsight, it would have signalled emerging economic and financial problems well ahead of the onset of the crisis and the subsequent negative rating actions of credit rating agencies. The scorecard can be used to enhance the ESM's analytical capacity to identify potential sovereign weaknesses in a timely manner, as well as support the ESM's external policy line and advice.
Literature review
There is an abundant literature on early warning system (EWS) models, mostly focused on currency and banking crises. These empirical studies differ according to (i) the definition of crisis events, whether currency, banking or fiscal crises, (ii) the methodology adopted, with the two most widely used approaches being the non-parametric "signals approach" (or "indicators approach") and the multivariate regression approach based on probit or logit models, (iii) the set of indicators used, and finally (iv) the country and time period coverage.
The regression approach consists of panel models analysing the impact of a set of independent variables on crisis probability, with a binary dependent variable equal to one if a crisis occurs and zero otherwise. The impact of a set of determinants on the crisis probability is then derived by estimating the model and testing the coefficients' significance. Berg and Patillo (1999) use this approach to predict currency crises and find that the crisis probability increases with changes in the predictive indicators. As explained by Berti et al (2012) , from a methodological point of view, this approach has the advantage of taking into account correlations between variables and testing for the statistical significance of the variables. The predicted probability of a crisis taking place within a pre-defined time frame is calculated using the latest values of the explanatory variables and the estimated coefficients from the probit or logit model. The signals approach on the other hand, pioneered by Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998) in a paper on the determinants of currency crises, analyses the historic behaviour of a set of relevant variables and, based on the observation that some variables tend to behave differently prior to crises/stress events compared to normal times, tries to capture signals sent by the variables prior to these events 1 .
Early contributions on early warning indicators of fiscal risk have relied mainly on fiscal variables. Hemming, Kell and Schimmelpfennig (2003) find that the best fiscal indicators to assess risks of currency, debt and banking crises are short-term public debt, foreign-currency debt as well as other deficit measures. Manasse, Roubini and Schimmelpfennig (2003) focus on sovereign debt crises, and considering a wide set of variables, find that, ceteris paribus, countries with a high current account balance have a reduced probability of entering in a crisis.
More recently, Baldacci et al. (2011a) build a new index of fiscal stress that provides early warning signals of fiscal sustainability problems for advanced and emerging economies. They define fiscal stress events to capture crisis episodes that encompass public debt default and near-default events, as well as severe deteriorations in the fiscal solvency risk outlook leading to fiscal sustainability risks. Their fiscal stress index is based on a set of indicators that measure the risk of fiscal sustainability based on current fiscal variables, classified into basic fiscal variables, long-term fiscal trends, and asset and liability management. They also calculate thresholds that identify the likelihood of fiscal stress for a large set of fiscal variables, which are helpful for our own analysis.
In a follow-up paper, Baldacci et al. (2011b) calculate and propose an index of fiscal vulnerability and an index of fiscal stress to assess rollover risks based on a wider set of variables clustered around three themes: solvency based on current and expected future fiscal policies, long-term fiscal trends, and the characteristics of governments' assets and liabilities. The authors stress that the relationships between indicators and rollover risk are likely to be nonlinear and that these nonlinearities imply the existence 3 of thresholds for these indicators beyond which a crisis becomes significantly more likely. Since thresholds vary across countries and time, available estimates must be interpreted with caution. Hence, the paper complements an index of rollover risks based on a probabilistic approach, with an index based on "norms" for fiscal variables derived from historical averages across advanced and emerging economies.
Going beyond their analysis, Schaechter et al. (2011) present a range of indicators and analytical tools for assessing fiscal vulnerabilities and risks for advanced economies, including the risks emanating from shocks to baseline projections, market-based risk indicators, and spillover risks. To highlight related but conceptually distinct elements of fiscal risks and vulnerabilities, the six tools presented are organised mainly by their time horizon, covering key short-, medium-and long-term dimensions. Shortterm pressures are captured by assessing (i) gross funding needs, (ii) market perceptions of default risk, and (iii) stress dependence among sovereigns. Medium-and long-term pressures are summarised by (iv) medium-and long-term budgetary adjustment needs, (v) susceptibility of debt projections to growth and interest rate shocks, and (vi) stochastic risks to medium-term debt dynamics.
In line with this more holistic approach, Berti, Salto and Lequien (2012) show the importance of incorporating fiscal, financial and competitiveness variables in an early warning system for fiscal stress, as such variables appear to be better "leading indicators" of fiscal stress than fiscal variables are. They find that financial-competitiveness variables have a higher predictive power of fiscal stress than that displayed by fiscal variables. Similarly, Bassanetti et. al (2016) show that the dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio plays a critical role for market access and consequently that the level of the debt ratio should not be the only fiscal metric to assess the complex relationship between public debt and debt defaults/market access. Finally, Bouabdallah et. al (2017) introduce a comprehensive government debt sustainability analysis (DSA) framework for euro area sovereigns based on a deterministic DSA, which embeds debt simulations under a benchmark and various narrative shock scenarios, a stochastic DSA, providing for a probabilistic approach to debt sustainability, and other relevant indicators capturing liquidity and solvency risks. This reflects the need to have a broad-based assessment, cross-checking information and perspectives from various sources with a view to deriving a robust debt sustainability assessment.
Our own analysis, which is focused on the EFSF/ESM programme countries, builds on the existing literature and draws from the European Commission's debt sustainability analysis (2014b) and Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure as well as the IMF's Early Warning Exercise (2010). In the spirit of these exercises, we emphasise that our early warning system does not attempt "to predict crises" but rather aims at the early identification of economic vulnerabilities and tail risks that predispose a sovereign to a crisis, ideally to be better able to timely define risk-mitigating policies.
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Data and methodology
Our analysis of sovereign vulnerabilities is based on (i) a wide set of indicators categorised along six dimensions, (ii) a scoring system based on thresholds provided by the literature where available or determined by the percentiles from the historical distribution of a pool of OECD and non-OECD EU countries, (iii) an aggregation scheme, underpinned by principal components analysis and (iv) a traffic light system.
While we rely on annual data for all indicators, the assessment can, in principle, be updated at any point in time as data are updated and being revised throughout the year. All data are available from public sources with the exception of the ESM's Bank Viability Index (BVI). In case of publication, this indicator can be replaced by some of its publicly available components without significantly altering the overall results. Finally, the indicator is built on pseudo real-time data where time-series are lagged in order to ensure that the data chosen for a specific year are based on the data available at the beginning of that year. This is especially important for back-testing the signalling power of the tool. In this version, however, we used the currently available vintage of historical data for the back-testing, not data prior to subsequent revisions that were available at that time.
Dimensions
Sovereign vulnerability is assessed across the following six dimensions:
1. Government borrowing needs, conditions and debt structure. A country is assessed as more vulnerable the higher its financing needs and market perception of risk, and the lower the liquidity of its debt instruments traded in the market. Vulnerabilities can also arise depending on the structure of government debt, in particular, the composition of debt according to currency, maturity and holder, which may imply different exposure to interest rate or exchange rate risk or to shifts in the investor base. While the composition of debt certainly plays a role, it may have different implications for different countries and therefore it is assigned a relatively lower weight in the overall score. 2. Economic strength. Countries with stronger economic fundamentals and outlook are assessed as less vulnerable. 3. Fiscal position. Countries with a stronger underlying fiscal position, more favourable debt dynamics and better track record of fiscal performance are assessed as less vulnerable. 4. Financial sector and other contingent liabilities. In general, implicit or potential liabilities originating from the financial sector, government guarantees, accounts payable or adverse demographic trends are taken into account. 5. Institutional parameters. Countries with better institutional and political parameters are assessed to be better equipped to withstand any adverse developments. 6. Private leverage, credit and real estate. Countries where the private sector is less levered and where house prices and real estate activities are not growing or dropping excessively are assessed as less vulnerable.
Each dimension includes a set of indicators. The selection of the indicators is based on the related literature (see e.g. IMF 2010 , 2011a , 2011b , and EC 2014a and 2014b while taking into account results of the principal component analysis (Section 3.3). More details about data sources and definitions of individual indicators can be found in Annex 1. 
Scoring and thresholds
The selected indicators are standardised to a homogenous scale. For each indicator, we define three time-invariant thresholds that allow per country and point in time to assign a 1 to 4 score. Where available, the thresholds for the scoring of the indicators were taken from the existing literature. Alternatively, the thresholds were set in line with quartiles of the historical distribution of OECD and EU countries in 2002-2016. The quartiles can be interpreted as follows: If a country is among the 25% of best-performers, it is assigned the score 4 (most resilient), countries in the second quartile are assigned the score 3, third quartile 2, while those among the 25% worst-performers are assigned the score 1 (most vulnerable).
For three indicators, which fall under the 'Leverage, credit and real estate' dimension, we diverge from this rule and instead assign scores based on quintiles, whereby the lowest and highest quintile are assigned the worst vulnerability score 1. The third quintile is assigned the best vulnerability score 4 and the second and fourth quintile are both assigned the score 2.5. This is to account for the fact that exceptionally high as well as negative credit and house-price growth increase a country's vulnerability, whereas modest positive growth is associated with low vulnerabilities.
A table summarising the thresholds used for each indicator can be found in Annex 2.
Aggregation and weights
The aggregate scores are calculated as a weighted average of scores of individual indicators. A stylised overview of the weights for our selected indicators can be found in Figure 1 . The weights are based on expert judgement, informed by principal component analysis (PCA), correlation analysis and literature. This approach resulted into the following considerations:
 First, based on correlation analysis, we assign higher weight to indicators which are more strongly correlated to proxies of financial or economic stress, such as future GDP growth rates, rating actions or changes in government bond spreads.  Based on the PCA, we identify groups of indicators within the dimensions, which follow similar trends and are thus deemed to explain the same underlying vulnerability. We then lower the weights of individual indicators in these groups to avoid overrepresentation of vulnerabilities captured by more individual indicators.  As a result, the highest weights are assigned to vulnerability causes such as government borrowing needs, conditions and debt structure, followed by economic strength as well as private leverage credit and real estate.  In a first step, we analyse the correlation structure of the data and indeed find strong correlation between certain indicators, justifying further principal component analysis.  In a second step, we conduct PCA. We identify 11 latent factors that have associated eigenvalues larger than one in explaining the standardised scores across all indicators. If we run the analysis per dimension, we identify between two and four factors, under the same selection criterion.  Next, we conduct varimax factor rotation in order to obtain a simpler structure while still maintaining the same explanatory power.  Finally, for each indicator, we drop all but the largest factor loading, obtaining a 1-to-n association between factors and indicators. For presentational purposes, we rescale the loadings to sum to 100 per factor. The resulting numbers can be interpreted as weights for 'intermediate composite indicators' that constitute the identified factors.
This PCA and correlation analysis (Annex 3) exposed several patterns. Amongst those are the separation between stock and flow variables, the high interconnection between World Bank institutional indicators, as well as the uniqueness of real estate market developments.
Traffic lights
To improve visualisation, we complement the quantitative assessment with a system of traffic lights. Given uncertainty surrounding the calculations as well as limitations of any one-size-fits-all approach, our analysis should not be interpreted as an exact numerical exercise. Therefore, we opt to classify countries into four broad categories reflecting the severity of countries' vulnerabilities. The system of traffic lights indicates low vulnerability (green), moderate vulnerability (yellow), elevated vulnerability (orange) and high vulnerability (red). To identify the cut-off values for the scores, we decided to use the following rounded thresholds:
Figure 2: Traffic light percentiles
To verify the validity of these thresholds, we compare our overall vulnerability score with the average ratings of the sovereigns assigned by Fitch, Moody's and S&P over the 2007-16 time period. We assume that the ratings were on average accurate, albeit sometimes with a delay. Figure 3 shows the average scores for rating ranges determined by the following thresholds: the ESM's General Eligible Asset List (AA-), the ECB's Credit Quality Steps 1&2 (A-), and the agencies' investment-grade status (BBB-). As expected, we observe a strong positive correlation between our overall vulnerability score and the sovereign ratings. Specifically, sovereigns rated below investment grade (BB+ or below) have an average score of about 1.9 whereas those rated 'AA-' or above score around 2.7. Sovereigns rated between 'BBB-' and 'BBB+' score on average 2.1 whereas the vulnerability score of those rated between 'A-' and 'A+' is around 2.5. Respective histograms can be found in Annex 4. The thresholds of our traffic lights are therefore somewhat more conservative. We can argue that in our system, the country has to broadly outperform the average rating in the respective rating range to qualify for the corresponding vulnerability category. 
Results
Our results are summarised in an overall vulnerability score ranging from 1 (very vulnerable) to 4 (very resilient). To assess the signalling power of the tool prior to the crisis, we look at the evolution of vulnerabilities over time. Figure 6 provides an overall summary assessment in the form of a heat map that allows to visualise the ranking of countries, as well as the main sources of their strength and vulnerabilities. Compared to the situation prior to the euro area crisis, the EFSF/ESM programme countries improved their resilience in most dimensions, but, with the exception of Ireland, still remain below the unweighted average of other euro area countries. 
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Case study: Prior to and after the EFSF/ESM programme intervention
This section shows the development of sovereign vulnerabilities for the five countries which requested financial assistance from the EFSF/ESM for the period before and since the inception of the programme. Due to annual data, and in the case of Cyprus also due to the delay in negotiations, the first year of the intervention differs in some cases from the year of the request (Table 7 ).
Figure 7: Dates of request for EFSF/ESM financial assistance
As can be observed in the charts below, the developments in terms of vulnerability before the EFSF/ESM intervention were unfavourable in all the five countries according to most vulnerability dimensions and improved following the programme intervention. The two exceptions in the postintervention period are the borrowing conditions for Greece, driven mostly by the increasing share of short-term debt, which were not offset by a decline in government bond yields, and Spain's slightly weakened institutional parameters as measured by the World Bank. 
Comparison with credit rating agencies
Sovereign ratings are the Credit Rating Agencies' (CRA) synthesised assessment of a central government's ability and willingness to service its non-official debt in full and on time, in accordance with the conditions agreed with creditors at the time of issuance. To assess sovereign creditworthiness, CRAs look at a combination of macroeconomic, public finance, external finance as well as institutional factors. Even though the methodological approaches, variables and the weights are not the same, and further, even though the rating assessment of agencies varies between an estimate of the probability of default (S&P and Fitch) and the expected loss (Moody's), the key factors analysed by Moody's, S&P and Fitch are very similar (Figure 8 ).
Figure 8: Stylized sovereign rating methodologies
Source: Credit rating agencies.
In this context, sovereign ratings serve as a useful benchmark to assess the signalling power of our indicator. One of the aims of our tool is to allow early detection of adverse developments. As CRAs are often criticised for reacting to the deterioration in sovereign creditworthiness with a delay, we take comfort in the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, the tool would have indicated a deterioration in vulnerabilities well ahead of the rating actions of the CRAs (Figure 9 ). 
Case study: Ireland
We demonstrate the assessment for an individual country on the example of Ireland. The overall score indicates that Ireland is currently subject to moderate vulnerabilities. It continues to be subject to risks from high private-and public-sector indebtedness, as well as susceptibility to credit and housing bubbles. However, this is compensated by considerable economic strength and a sound underlying fiscal position, including a strong historical fiscal discipline.
Regarding the evolution over time, Ireland observed a rapid deterioration of its sovereign resilience starting already in 2007, which was followed by a remarkable recovery from the economic crisis. Currently it ranks above the euro area average in most dimensions.
There is room for further improvement in the area of explicit and contingent liabilities. It should also be noted that overall high volatility of macroeconomic indicators and, in particular, recent major shifts in national accounts call for extra caution when assessing Ireland's economic situation. 
Conclusion and limitations
The sovereign vulnerability scorecard represents a simple, yet relatively comprehensive tool for an assessment of sovereign vulnerabilities. First, it allows assessing a country's present vulnerability in comparison to other countries or to historical periods. Second, it can be used to assess the evolution over time and identify adverse trends in underlying factors that may lead to a heightened vulnerability risk. Finally, the tool allows for the identification of main sources of vulnerabilities pointing to areas where a policy action may be needed.
Our results show that the tool has a meaningful signalling power in assessing sovereign vulnerabilities. This was also confirmed by back-testing to the period prior to the crisis as early as 2005, showing that for the countries which requested EFSF/ESM financial assistance, our tool would have identified the build-up of vulnerabilities well ahead of the negative rating actions of credit rating agencies. However, it should be stressed that this is possible with the benefit of hindsight. At the same time, the framework does not represent an exact exercise. While the results are judgement-free, a careful interpretation is needed to draw policy conclusions.
The framework may benefit from further improvements in several areas. The principal component analysis indicated that a better distinction between flow and stock variables may be warranted. In the same vein, a more elaborate distinction between short-term and medium-to long-term indicators may improve prediction power over different time horizons. In addition, using infra-annual data, in particular for short-term indicators, promises a better grasp of the latest developments. Finally, the prediction power may be further improved by testing the aggregation scheme using conditional weights across the six vulnerability dimensions.
Annex 1: Definition of indicators
If not mentioned otherwise, indicator source is the latest AMECO database vintage from the European Commission. For indicators with forecasts available and where we are capturing evolvements over time (through moving averages, moving sums or moving standard deviations), in general we include one forward-looking observation, thus one year of forecast for the most recent figure. Thresholds for transforming values to the standardised discrete 1 to 4 scale refer to quartile-bounds considering the sample of observed data on annual frequency for the available OECD and non-OECD EU countries from 2002 to 2015. For backward aggregation, data is assumed constant before the first available data point.
Annex 2: Thresholds for indicators
Notes: Countries that on a certain indicator for a point in time perform worse than the "worst" threshold are given the score 1, falling between "worst" and "middle" corresponds to score 2, between "middle" and "best" to score 3, and performing better than threshold "best" is assigned the top score of 4. Thresholds indicated with "°" are literature derived or based on own analysis. The remaining thresholds correspond to the 25 th , 50 th and 75 th percentiles of the observed historical distribution from OECD and EU countries in the years 2002 to 2015. The last three credit and house price-related variables are assessed taking into consideration that extreme positive and negative values (the highest and lowest quintile) are associated with high vulnerabilities thus being assigned the lowest score 1. Modest positive growth is assigned the highest score 4. Credit growth (%) > 56.4 < 4. 
